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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
CONSTITuTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL TRADE Co
IIssIoN ASSERTS
JURISDICTION OVER INSURANCE ADVERTISING IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE. In the Matter of The American Hospital and Life

Insurance Company, F.T.C. No. 6237, April 24, 1956. The Federal
Trade Commission issued a complaint against the American
Hospital and Life Insurance Company, alleging false and misleading advertising in the solicitation and sale of insurance in
interstate commerce. Respondent, a Texas corporation, is licensed
to conduct an insurance business in Texas and thirteen other
states. The policies are sold exclusively through agents in each
state. The complaint charged that the advertising brochures,
sent from the home office in Texas to the agents in these thirteen
states, excluding Texas, contained false, misleading and deceptive representations in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Ace, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1951). These
brochures were never sent directly to the public but were only
shown by the agents to prospective customers. Each of these
thirteen states, except Mississippi, has laws forbidding the
distribution of false insurance advertising within the state. The
hearing examiner dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
as regards all the states except Mississippi, on the ground that
these states fully regulated the business of insurance concerning
the distribution of false insurance advertising within its borders,
and consequently the jurisdiction of the FTC had been withdrawn by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1952). On appeal the FTC reversed this
finding by a three to two vote and asserted jurisdiction. Held, the
McCarran Act did not withdraw FTC jurisdiction over allegedly
false advertising sent across state lines as part of an insurance
transaction, though the state into which this advertising was
sent had laws forbidding distribution of such advertising within
its borders.
For over seventy-five years, since Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168 (1868), the Supreme Court had consistently held
that transactions of insurance did not constitute interstate commerce. See New York Life Ins. ,Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231
U.S. 495 (1913). In 1944 the Supreme Court in United States v.
South-Eastern UnderwritersAss'n., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), held for
the first time that insurance transactions conducted across state
'lines did constitute interstate commerce, thus bringing to bear the
paramount power of Congress under the commerce clause. A
great deal of confusion followed. Five months later Congress
:passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, supra. The act was entitled:
"An Act to express the intent of Congress with reference to the
(319)
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regulation of the business of insurance." The act provided in
part, 59 Stat. 33-34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (1952):
...That the Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation
and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is
in the public interest, and that silence on the part of Congress shall
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation
of such business by the several States.
Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
Sec. 2. (b) . . . [Alfter January 1, 1948, the . . . Sherman Act,

and .. .the Clayton Act, and . . .the Federal Trade Commission
Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the
extent that such business is not regulated by State law. (Emphasis

added.)

The act also suspended the application of these laws entirely until
January 1, 1948, except as they concerned boycotts, coercion and
intimidation under the Sherman Act. In 1947 the act was amended, extending the moratorium period in section 2 (b) to June 30,
1948.
The FTC members disagreed in the instant decision as to the
act's effect upon the jurisdiction of the FTC over insurance
transactions conducted in interstate commerce. This divergence
turned upon the construction of section 2 (b) of the act.
The majority found that insurance transactions across state
lines, being in interstate commerce, necessarily involved some
purely interstate aspects, which only Congress can regulate. They

reasoned from this that the intent of Congress must have been
that the "extent" to which the states regulate the business of
insurance, provided in section 2 (b), is restricted to the limit of
the states' constitutional power. Since the states have no power
to regulate purely interstate aspects, Congress by making the
Federal Trade Commission Act applicable to the insurance business, must have intended that the FTC should have jurisdiction
over these purely interstate aspects, necessarily superseding
state laws which covered the same matter in a different and local
phase of the transaction, since the federal commerce power is
paramount when exerted. They held that the F.T.C.A. and the
state laws supplement each other to provide the fullest protection
to the public, as the F.T.C.A. can govern interstate aspects which
the states would be powerless to cope with. The majority leave all
intrastate aspects to the states to the extent that the states regulate them, even though interstate commerce might be affected,
as long as the states' exertion of jurisdiction does not conflict with
the exertion of jurisdiction by the FTC over purely interstate
aspects. In the Matter of the American Hospital and Life Ins. Co.,
supra, Opinion of the Commission at 6-7.
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The dissenting members of the Commission protested strongly
that the majority holding reduces the McCarran Act to the point
of having no effect whatever. They believe that the-clear wording
of the act, as well as the express congressional policy and legislative history, clearly show that the intent of Congress was to have
the states continue to regulate the business of insurance as they
had for seventy-five years on the intrastate level and to condition application of the F.T.C.A. on whether the states did so
regulate. They contended that, when a state adequately regulated
an insurance transaction on the intrastate level and thereby
sufficiently protected its citizens, the F.T.C.A. would not apply
to even the purely interstate aspects involved, because Congress
had expressly recognized that the insurance business was better
regulated by state laws. In the Matter of the American Hospital
and Life Ins. Co., supra dissenting opinion at 6, 14.
This jurisdictional question has- not arisen in any reported
case. Only one case has dealt directly with section 2 (b) of the
act. In North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty ReciprocalExchange, 85 F. Supp. 961 (1949), af'd, 181 F.2d 174 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950), the state had passed a
statute making insurance rating agencies lawful. The National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters was licensed and authorized by
Arkansas to act as a rating agency in that state. Such rating
agencies violate the Sherman Act. Although there appeared to be
purely interstate aspects in the operations of this bureau, the
court held that the Sherman Act did not apply because this
state statute constituted proper regulation within the meaning
of section 2 (b) of the McCarran Act.
The Supreme Court, as well as various federal and state
courts, has interpreted the general intent of Congress in the
McCarran Act. They all agree that this intent was to permit the
states to continue to tax and regulate the business of insurance;
however, they always limit this general statement by adding
words similar to those of the Supreme Court, when it said "except
as otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future
legislation." PrudentialIns. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30
(1946); see Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n., 332 U.S. 507, 521 (1947). With the exception of the
North Little Rock case, supra, none of the cases involved a
conflict between a state insurance law and any of the three
federal laws in section 2 (b).
The majority opinion relied heavily upon the decision in United
States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 943 (1952). However, this case is clearly not relevant,
because it involved only the postal power of Congress and not
the commerce power.
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The majority of the FTC impliedly reason that, once Congress
exerts its commerce power generally in a particular area of
interstate commerce, in order to withdraw the force of the
federal laws it must withdraw their application completely. Yet
they seem to overlook the fact that, while Congress cannot
delegate its commerce power to the states, it may exercise this
power in its own discretion and may according to established
doctrine occupy a limited field and, upon matters in interstate
commerce which do not demand uniform federal regulation, may
consent to state legislation. See PanhandleEastern Pipe Line Co.
-v. Public Serv. Comm'n., supra; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761 (1945); Southern Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n., 236 U.S.
439 (1915); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). The court in State
v. PrudentialIns. Co., 224 Ind. 17, 64 N.E.2d 150 (1945), aff'd per
curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946), decided that Congress had so
exercised its power, saying, 64 N.E.2d at 158:
In our opinion, the McCarran-Ferguson Act is an exercise of the
right of Congress to regulate interstate phases and aspects of the
insurance business, by authorizing the states to continue their
regulation and taxation of such business in the manner developed
over 75 years of experience. (Emphasis added.)

The Supreme Court has also pointed out that Congress by the
McCarran Act had exercised "its power to consent to state
legislation." PrudentialIns. Co. v. Benjamin, supra, at 438 n.51.
Moreover, the court in PrudentialIns. Co. v. Barnett, 200 Miss.
233, 27 So. 2d 60 (1946), indicated that Congress had withheld
federal power by direct enactment.
However, these cases do not settle clearly the is ue at hand.
It is possible that Congress decided that federal uniform regulation of interstate aspects was desirable, even though state
jurisdiction in some instances would be thwarted; on the other
hand, Congress could have decided that a policy of non-interference with state regulation was desirable due to the states'
experience and well developed laws specially geared to insurance.
Before the McCarran Act was passed, the original bills of the
House and Senate differed in some respects and were sent to
a conference committee, which agreed upon the compromise in the
present act. It is interesting to note that both the original bills,
passed by the House and Senate and unanimously approved by
the Committee on the Judiciary, contained a section which
provided that nothing in the F.T.C.A. would apply to the business
of insurance. Only the Sherman and Clayton Acts were to apply
after the moratorium. 91 CoNG. REc. 488, 1027, 1085 (1945).
During the Senate debate Senator Ferguson, co-author of the
bill, gave the reason for this section which excluded the F.T.C.A.
completely, explaining that:
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The purpose of that provision is very dear, that Congress did not
want at the present time to take upon itself the responsibility of
interfering with the taxation of insurance or the regulation of
insurance by the States. We were able to single out and to indicate
that we had in mind . . . acts of which we wanted to make
exceptions, because they did not relate to insurance. Id. at 481.

Representative Gwynne added that:
When we passed those acts, Congress did not have in mind insurance
... The methods of control exercised by the States and by the
Federal Government are conflicting, and the sole purpose of this
bill is to take out as much of that conflict as possible until we can
determine whether Congress will regulate insurance, or whether
it will permit the States to regulate it. Id. at 1089-90.

In the conference bill the F.T.C.A. appeared in the moratorium
clause with the Sherman and Clayton Acts for the first time. The
House passed it without further debate. Senator Ferguson, a
member of the conference committee, explained the intent of
the committee, saying: ".

.

. if the States were specifically to

legislate upon a particular point, and that legislation were contrary to the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, or the Federal Trade
Commission Act, then the State law would be binding....." Id.
at 1481.
On the other hand, Senator O'Mahoney, also a committee
member, pointed out that after the moratorium the F.T.C.A.
and the other acts would "come to life again in the field of
interstate commerce and in the field of interstate regulation" and
that one state could not regulate for other states. Id. at 1483.
Senator McCarran admitted that there would always exist
two jurisdictions, and that these federal laws would apply
throughout the whole field beyond the activity of the states.
Yet he added that if "the states themselves had regulated the
business of insurance" these federal acts "would not become
effective" (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1443.
It must be noted that in the instant case the exertion of
jurisdiction by the FTC over only the interstate aspects resulted
in taking the whole matter from the states. Thus, if the Supreme
Court is faced with this problem, it appears that final decision
must rest solely upon the congressional intent. The power of
Congress would not be in issue.
The difficulty apparent in the majority position lies in its
effect. The F.T.C.A. would apply to interstate aspects regardless
of the extent to which the states regulated. Thus the states,
although encouraged by Congress to legislate, would lose
jurisdiction over any insurance transaction which had purely
interstate aspects and which violated the F.T.C.A., the Sherman
Act or the Clayton Act. In view of the extensive manner in

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XX.XII

which insurance companies operate today, there appear to be
countless transactions that have some purely interstate aspects.
The inevitable effect would be that the states would lose jurisdiction, apparently frustrating the expressed intent of Congress not
to interfere and to allow the states to continue regulating insurance.
It is submitted the sounder view is that Congress intended to
withhold the applicability of the F.T.C.A. and the Sherman and
Clayton Acts over purely interstate aspects of insurance transactions, on the condition that the states adequately handle the
situation on the intrastate level by legislation. The dissenting
members seem to be giving sound advice when they warn that
the majority view frustrates the clear intent of Congress and
destroys rather than complements state regulation.
William J. Ragan

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE--OHIO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-

TION ACT-SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS UNDER EATON GUARANTEED
ANNUAL WAGE PLAN. On July 13, 1956, the Ohio Bureau of Un-

employment Compensation considered the guaranteed annual
wage contract of the Eaton Manufacturing Company of Cleveland, Ohio, and ruled that the payment of unemployment benefits
under the firm's contract would not bar concurrent payment of
state unemployment benefits to the employee. Ohio Bureau of
Unemployment, Press Release, July 15, 1956. Under the Eaton
"Individual Income Security Plan" the company set up an individual account for each employee, crediting to it three and a
half cents for each hour worked. EATON MANUFACTURING COMPANY INCOME SECURITY PLAN, Art. III, §§ 3, 4. The employee may
draw from his fund during a period of unemployment and at the
termination of his employment. At his death the balance is paid
to his beneficiaries. EATON
SECURITY PLAN, Arts. V, VI.

MANUFACTURING COMPANY

INCOME

Seemingly, this decision is contrary to a previous Bureau
ruling of 'May 15, 1956, denying the payment of supplementary
unemployment benefits under the Ford plan. Ohio Bureau of
Unemployment, Press Release, May 15, 1956. The Ford plan
consisted of one fund to be established in trust for all employees.
It could be drawn from only during periods of unemployment.
In striking down the Ford plan the Bureau had ruled that
receipt by the employee of annual wage benefits under the
Ford contract constituted "remuneration" as that term is used in
the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act, OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. §4141.01 (h) (Page 1953), and therefore barred con-
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current state unemployment benefits since the Act provides
that benefits payable for any week shall be reduced by any
amount of remuneration received for that week. OHno REV. CODE
ANN. § 4141.31 (Page 1953). The Bureau concluded in relation to
the Ford plan:
.. . private supplemental benefits must be deemed compensation
for personal services within the meaning of the Ohio unemployment
compensation law and a claimant's benefits would be reduced by
the amount of any supplementation benefits he received under the
plan. 38 Lab. Rel. Rep. 88 (1956).
The Ohio Senate, on June 14, 1955, had rejected by a vote of
21 to 12 a proposed amendment of the Unemployment Compensation Act which would have allowed the payment of
supplementary unemployment benefits (SUB) and the Ohio
voters, on November 8, 1955, by nearly a two to one majority,
rejected a proposed initiated law which would have allowed
supplementation. In rendering its decision on the Ford plan the
Bureau took these previous defeats into consideration, stating:
In view of the action of the legislature on the question of'supplementation and the defeat at the polls of the proposal to amend our
law specifically authorizing supplementation, we are convinced that
unless we can find a clear intention in the present law to permit
such supplementation, we cannot rule that private supplemental
benefits could be paid for the same week with respect to which
state unemployment, benefits are payable, without reduction of the
amount of such state unemployment benefits. We have been unable
to find any such clear intention which would permit such a ruling
by the Bureau. Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation,
Press Release, May 15, 1956.
The Bureau's broad interpretation of "remuneration" which
outlawed the payment of supplemefital benefits under the Ford
plan stands contrary to the decisions of most other states that
have ruled on the plan. The following jurisdictions have approved
SUB under the Ford plan, finding that such benefits did- not
constitute "remuneration" or "wages": Alabama, 38 L.R.R.M. 68
(1956); Arizona, 39 L.R.R.M. 63 (1956-57) ; Arkansas, 37 L.R.R.M.
16 (1955-56); California, 38 L.R.R.M. 70 (1956); Colorado, 39
L.R.R.M. 63 (1956-57); Connecticut, 36 L.R.R.M. 215 (1955);
Delaware, 36 L.R.R.M. 216 (1955); Washington, D.C., 38
L.R.R.M. 70 (1956); Florida, 38 L.R.R.M. 72 (1956); Illinois,
38 L.R.R.M. 73 (1956); Iowa, 38 L.R.R.M. 80 (1956); Kansas,
38 L.R.R.M. 81 (1956); Kentucky, 37 L.R.R.M. 20 (1955-56);
Louisiana, 38 L.R.R.M. 82 (1956); Massachusetts, 36 L.R.R.M.
218 (1955); Michigan, 37 L.R.R.M. 20 (1955-56); Minnesota, 38
L.R.R.M. 83 (1956); Missouri, 38 L.R.R.M. 86 (1956); New
Jersey, 36 L.R.R.M. 222 (1955); New York, 36 L.R.R.M. 224
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(1955); North Dakota, 39 L.R.R.M. 63 (1956-57); Oklahoma, 38
L.R.R.M. 92 (1956); Pennsylvania, 37 L.R.R.M. 23 (1955-56);
Tennessee, 38 L.R.R.M. 95 (1956); Washington, 37 L.R.R.M.
25 (1955-56); West Virginia, 39 L.R.R.M. 81 (1956-57); Wisconsin,
38 L.R.R.M. 96 (1956). Also, in a ruling of October 6, 1956, the
Ford plan was approved in Canada. 39 Lab. Rel. Rep. 4 (1956).
Two states, Georgia and Maryland, have enacted specific legislation allowing supplementation, MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 95A, §
19 (n) (9) (Supp. 1956); GA. CODE AwN. § 54-657 (n) (2) (Supp.
1955), and two other states, Virginia and Oregon, have passed
statutes denying supplementation, VA. CODE ANN. § 60-22 (Supp.
1956); ORE. REv. STAT. § 657.205 (a) (1955).
The Ohio Bureau in the Eaton decision reaffirmed its previous
stand oil the Ford plan, and sought to distinguish the two
situations. The chief distinction is that under the Eaton Plan,
an individual account was set up for each employee, while under
the Ford Plan only one fund was set up in trust for all
employees as a unit. Both plans are essentially employer-financed
trust programs, and the distinctions between them do not appear
significant enough to warrant the different conclusions reached
by the Ohio Bureau.
According to a letter of November 20, 1956, from the administrator of the Bureau to the writer:
The Bureau's only consideration in arriving at this opinion was the
fact that the worker obtained a vested right to the money immediately upon its being deposited in the individual trust account.
The money was therefore considered to be wages at that time and,
therefore, taxable under the Ohio law.

This "vested right" approach is not a unique analysis of the
problem. The attorney general of West Virginia earlier had rested
a similar decision regarding the Pittsburg Plate Glass Company
plan upon the same grounds. 37 L.R.R.M. 28 (1956). In the
course of his ruling the attorney general pointed out the
similarity between the income security program and an individual
banking account and explained that withdrawals from such a
banking account could not be considered "wages." The Pittsburg income security plan was analogized to a profit sharing
trust set up by an employer, which had been held not to
constitute "earnings" when the employee drew from the fund
during a period of unemployment. Kerr v. Director of Employment Security, 332 Mass. 78, 123 N.E.2d 229 (1954). The attorney
general further explained that while such contributions were
not "wages" at the time of withdrawal, they were "wages" at
the time of contribution by the employer, and thus required
tax contributions upon them by the employer to the state
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unemployment compensation fund. 37 L.R.R.M. 28 (1956).
Despite the validity of the Bureau's "only consideration" and
its West Virginia precedent, the real basis for the Eaton ruling
would seem to lie elsewhere. Perhaps public opinion, since the
1955 vote, had swung in favor of supplementation as it became
more familiar to the public. Possibly the Bureau felt that the
referendum vote did not reflect true opinion in the first place,
because grouped with the supplementation proposal on the
same ballot were proposals to raise the maximum unemployment compensation payment from $39 to $59 and to extend the
period of payment from twenty-six to thirty-nine weeks. It is
possible that had the voters been given only the supplementation
proposal they would have apiroved it. The Bureau may have
felt that some sort of supplementation was necessary to give
greater effect to the social security purposes of the unemployment
compensation law. Also, the favorable rulings on supplementation
handed down contemporaneously with the Ohio ruling on the
Ford plan by Ohio's border states of Pennsylvania, Kentucky,
and Michigan, may have caused the Bureau to fear a movement of
marginal, cyclical workers from Ohio to those states for new
jobs. In fact, such marginal workers could continue their jobs
in Ohio while moving their residence to one of the above
neighboring states. In this manner they could receive private
benefits by mail and, by registering with the employment
security agency of the new state, also receive unemployment
compensation benefits accrued in Ohio. See Masson and Krislov,
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits and Public Policy in Ohio,
7 WEsTEPRN RES. L. REV. 436 (1956).
In any event the stated reasons for the Bureau's ruling
hardly justify such a complete reversal regarding supplementation in so short a time. By its second ruling the Bureau
has called in question its first ruling, despite its reaffirmance in
the Eaton decision of its prior Ford opinion. The establishment
of this halfway house has beclouded the entire question of supplementation in Ohio.
Perhaps the best solution to the problem is that proposed
by the Bureau itself in its Ford decision: "This is such an
important issue, affecting the future administration of the Ohio
Unemployment Law that it should be resolved by the legislature,
by specific legislation either permitting the right to supplementation or denying it." Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation,
Press Release, May 15, 1956.*
John P. Callahan
* Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Ohio Legislative Service
Commission has reported its findings regarding the current status of SUB
in Ohio, and has reached substantially the same conclusions as the writer.
OHIo LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COIS'N, STAFF RESEARCH REPORT No. 22 (1957).

